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•  Second, the bankers argued that the new regulation
ignores the Congressional intent to limit Farm Credit
System financing to those farm-related businesses providing
on-farm, “custom-type” services.  The old regulations had
contained a limitation to that effect.15
The court rejected the bankers’ position and noted that
the Congress never placed such restrictions on Farm Credit
lending.16
•  The bankers also challenged FCA on the part of the
new regulations authorizing Farm Credit financing of
merchants whose primary function is selling inputs or
purchasing farm products.17  Under the old regulations,
loans could be made to commercial enterprises selling
inputs or purchasing outputs only if “substantially all of
such inputs handled [were] used incident to the services
provided.”18
The court pointed out that the statute broadly permits the
financing of any business furnishing farm-related services
directly related to on-farm operating needs.  As the court
noted, Farm Credit financing is still only available for
“farm-related” businesses.19
•  The bankers objected to the scope of lending to
cooperatives.  The statute states that Farm Credit has the
authority to lend for “farm or aquatic business services or
services to [other] eligible cooperatives.”2 0   The old
regulations had defined “farm or aquatic business services”
narrowly to mean “any goods, business, or services
normally used by farmers, ranchers, or producers or
harvesters of aquatic products which contribute to their
business operations or are in furtherance of the welfare or
security of the livelihood of such persons.”21  The new
regulations allow lending for “any goods or services
normally used by farmers, ranchers, or producers and
harvesters of aquatic products in their business operations
or to improve the welfare or livelihood of such persons.”22
The court agreed with Farm Credit’s argument that
nothing of substance was changed by the amendment.23
•  Finally, the new regulations eliminated the limits on
lending to farm and ranch corporations.  Under the old
rules, a corporation or other “legal entity” had to satisfy at
least one of three criteria in order to be an eligible
barrower—(1) more than 50 percent of the value or number
of shares of the stock or equity is owned by individuals
conducting the agricultural or aquatic operation; (2) more
than 50 percent of the value of the entity’s assets consist of
assets related to the production of agricultural or the
production or harvesting of aquatic products; or (3) more
than 50 percent of the entity’s income is generated by the
production of agricultural products or the production or
harvesting of aquatic products.24
The court said this move was entirely consistent with the
statute.25
Implications of the decision
The decision has been appealed and the Court of
Appeals will have another look at it.  Given the heavy
burden of proof it seems unlikely that the appellate court
will view it differently.
If there is to be a change, it is up to Congress.  And that
does not seem likely at the moment.
FOOTNOTES
1 Independent Bankers Association of America and
American Bankers Association v. Farm Credit
Administration, Civ. No. 97-00695 (D. D.C. 1997),
hereinafter “Bankers”.  See generally 11 Harl,
Agricultural Law, ch. 100 (1997); Harl, Agricultural
Law Manual § 11.01[2] (1997).
2 62 Fed. Reg. 4433, Jan. 30, 1997.
3 12 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq.
4 Farm Credit Act of 1971, Sec. 2001(a), 12 U.S.C. §
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5 60 Fed. Reg. 47,103, Sept. 11, 1995.
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7 Id.
8 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
9 See Bankers, supra n. 1, n. 3.
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11 12 C.F.R. § 613.3020(b)(1), amended by 62 Fed. Reg.
4442, Jan. 30, 1997.
12 12 C.F.R. §§ 613.3020(a)(4), 613.3050.
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15 12 C.F.R. § 613.3050(a).
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17 12 C.F.R. § 613.3020, amended by 62 Fed. Reg. 4442,
Jan. 30, 1997.
18 12 C.F.R. § 613.3050(b)(2).
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20 12 U.S.C. § 2129(a).
21 12 C.F.R. § 613.3110(a)(3).
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23 Bankers, supra n. 1.
24 12 C.F.R. § 613.3020(b)(1).
25 Bankers, supra n. 1.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE. The debtor failed to timely file tax
returns for 1980-1982. In 1985, the IRS prepared substitute
returns and assessed the debtor for the taxes determined by
those returns. The debtor did not assist the IRS in preparing
the returns nor did the debtor sign those returns. In 1995,
the debtor filed returns for 1980-1982 mirroring the returns
prepared by the IRS. The debtor sought to have the 1980-
1982 taxes declared dischargeable because the debtor filed
the returns more than three years before the bankruptcy
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filing. The IRS argued that the debtor’s returns were a legal
nullity because the returns were ineffectual to change the
assessment of taxes. The court held that a valid return must
appear on its face to be an honest and genuine endeavor to
satisfy tax law. The court held that the debtor’s over ten-
year late returns were not an honest and genuine endeavor
to comply with the return filing requirements because the
only reason the returns were filed was to make the taxes
dischargeable. The court noted that the debtor made no
attempt to help the IRS prepare the substitute returns nor
did the debtor’s returns provide additional information. In
re Mickens, 214 B.R. 976 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
HEALTH INSURANCE. The debtor company had
provided one of its retired employees with life time health
insurance. The employee filed a claim in the Chapter 7
bankruptcy case for the cost of substitute insurance from
the time the debtor stopped paying premiums through the
estimated life expectancy of the employee. The issue raised
by the employee was that the payments on this bankruptcy
claim would not constitute wages subject to FICA and
FUTA taxes. The IRS argued that the payments would be
wages because the payments would not be made under an
employee benefit plan. The employee and Chapter 7 trustee
argued that the absence of the plan was beyond the control
of the employee and should not affect the character of the
payments. The court held that, in the bankruptcy context,
the payments were considered as made under a plan
because the failure of the company was a breach of the
employee benefit contract, giving rise to a claim in
bankruptcy for the amounts due under that contract. Thus,
the bankruptcy payments for the replacement insurance
would not be wages and would not be subject to FICA or
FUTA taxes. In re Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 215
B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1997).
CORPORATIONS
OFFICER LIABILITY. The defendant was hired to
construct a concrete driveway and patio for the plaintiff.
The defendant was the president, director and 50 percent
shareholder of a corporation which performed the work.
The defendant held the contractor’s cement license and
personally managed the construction of the driveway and
patio, with an employee performing the manual labor. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant personally was negligent
in constructing the driveway and patio both of which
developed several cracks. The defendant argued that only
the corporation could be liable for any damage, citing a
California Supreme Court case, United States Liability Ins.
Co. v. Haldinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal.3d 586 (1970), which
held that an officer owed a duty only to the corporation.
The court distinguished the case by pointing out that, in
Haldinger-Hayes, the president did not personally perform
the work involved. The court held that, where the officer of
a corporation personally performed the work contracted for
and performed the work negligently, the officer was
personally liable for the injury to persons or property. The
defendant also raised the issue that the case should have
been tried only under contract law and not tort, because the
injury arose out of a contractual relationship for the
performance of services. The court held that California law
allowed an action in tort for the negligent performance of a
contract which causes injury to persons or property. The
court found that the cracking driveway and patio presented
severe risks to the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s property. This
case was sent to us by Michael Mauer, CA. Michaelis v.
Benavides, __ Cal. Rptr. 2d ___, 98 Daily Journal
D.A.R. 1623 (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 18, 1998).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
MILK MARKETING ORDERS.  The plaintiff milk
producer association challenged as arbitrary and capricious
the Class I pricing scheme of the federal milk marketing
orders promulgated under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608c(1). The current ruling was
the third time the court had ruled on the issue of whether
the USDA had sufficient evidence to make the factual
findings required by the statute to support the pricing
scheme. In the first two rulings, the court found that the
USDA had failed to make specific factual findings as
required by the statute to support the pricing system. In the
current ruling, the court again found that the USDA did not
make sufficient factual findings as required by the statute.
The court concluded that after three attempts, the USDA
had no possibility of making the required factual findings
and held that the Class I pricing scheme was arbitrary and
contrary to the statute. The statute required the pricing
scheme to be based upon “the price of feeds, the available
supply of feeds, and other economic conditions which
affect market supply and demand for milk or its products in
the marketing area to which the contemplated marketing
agreemnt, order, or amendment relates.” Instead, the court
found that the current Class I pricing scheme was based
solely upon the local market’s distance from Eau Claire,
WI. The court found that, even if the distance differential
had an effect on local markets, the USDA had failed to
demonstrate that effect.   Minnesota Milk Producers v.
Glickman, 981 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1997). See also
Minnesota Milk Producers v. Glickman, 851 F. Supp. 1389
(D. Minn. 1994), on rem. from 956 F.2d 816 (8th Cir.
1993).
PESTICIDES. The EPA has adopted as final
regulations requiring specific precautionary labeling
relating to the flammability of total release fogger
pesticides. EPA has found that, as currently labeled, total
release foggers pose an unreasonable risk to property and
pesticide users from fires and explosions that can be caused
by a build up of extremely flammable propellants. EPA
expects that the additional flammability label warnings
required by this rule will reduce the potential for fires and
explosions by alerting consumers to the dangers of total
release foggers. The required labeling also provided
specific directions for proper use of these products with
minimal costs to industry or consumers. 63 Fed. Reg. 9077
(Feb. 23, 1998).
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TOBACCO. The FSA has adopted as final regulations
providing for special, but highly limited, combinations of
flue-cured tobacco allotments and quotas of farms having
production flexibility contracts under the Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 with
farms without production flexibility contracts; and, for
burley tobacco, an exemption to the loss of quota on farms
with less than 1,000 pounds of quota when the farm would
otherwise meet the requirements for a farm combination
but for the existence of a production flexibility contract. 63
Fed. Reg. 9126 (Feb. 24, 1998).
TUBERCULOSIS. The APHIS issued interim
regulations amending the tuberculosis regulations to
include species of livestock other than cattle and bison in
the requirement for two annual herd tests for newly
assembled herds on premises where a tuberculous herd has
been depopulated. This requirement was necessary because,
without testing, such livestock could become infected and
spread tuberculosis to the cattle or bison in the herd before
the disease was detected in the herd. 63 Fed. Reg. 8837
(Feb. 23, 1998).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS EXCLUSION-ALM
§ 5.03[3].* Rep. Hooley of Oregon has introduced a bill to
adjust for inflation the amount of a family-owned business
excluded from the gross estate of a decedent. H.R. 3227.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.*  The taxpayer established an
irrevocable trust for the taxpayer’s child. The trust granted
the trustee the discretionary power to distribute income and
principal to the beneficiary for the beneficiary’s health,
education and support. The beneficiary also had the right to
withdraw any contributions to the trust within 30 days after
notification from the trustee of the new contribution. The
trust was funded with S corporation stock. The IRS ruled
that the beneficiary would be considered the owner of the
trust, making the trust an eligible QSST. The IRS also ruled
that, given no understanding that the beneficiary would not
exercise the withdrawal right, the contributions to the trust
would be eligible for the annual exclusion. Ltr. Rul.
9809004, Nov. 6, 1997; Ltr. Rul. 9809005, Nov. 6, 1997;
Ltr. Rul. 9809006, Nov. 6, 1997; Ltr. Rul. 9809007, Nov.
6, 1997; Ltr. Rul. 9809008, Nov. 6, 1997.
JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY. In 1972, the
decedent and spouse had acquired stock in a tenants’
corporation for an apartment in New York City. The title to
the stock was held as joint tenants with right of
survivorship. The court had insufficient factual
development to determine the amount of consideration
furnished by each taxpayer for the stock. At the death of the
decedent, the estate included all of the value of the stock in
the decedent’s estate. The spouse then sold the stock, using
the federal estate tax basis for determining the gain from
the sale. The IRS recomputed the gain from the sale, using
only 50 percent of the value of the stock as the basis for
federal estate tax purposes. The IRS argued that the 1981
amendment of I.R.C. § 2040(b)(2) made I.R.C. §
2040(b)(1) effective for all estates of decedents dying after
December 31, 1981, regardless of when the joint tenancy
property was purchased. The court followed Gallenstein v.
United States, 975 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1992) to hold that the
amendment did not apply to joint tenancy interests created
prior to 1977; therefore, the decedent was not restricted to
including only 50 percent of the value of the stock in the
decedent’s estate but the amount of  stock included would
be determined under the consideration furnished test. Neil
Harl will publish an article on this case in the next issue of
the Digest. Hahn v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. No. 14 (1998).
LIFE INSURANCE. The decedent had established an
irrevocable trust and transferred to the trust insurance
policies on the decedent’s life. The trustees had full control
over the policies. At the death of the decedent, the trust was
to pay the lesser of $1 million or 5 percent of the gross
estate, including the trust principal, to an individual, with
the remainder to pass to the decedent’s issue. The trust
borrowed money from the decedent to pay the insurance
premiums. The loans were fully documented and payments
of principal and interest were made on the notes. The notes
were controlled by another trust and were included in the
decedent’s gross estate. The IRS ruled that the decedent did
not have any interest in the trust from the decedent’s power
to set the trustees’ compensation. The IRS also ruled that
the decedent did not possess any incidents of ownership
over the insurance policies as a result of the loans. The IRS
ruled that the payment of the premiums is irrelevant as to
who retained any incidents of ownership, citing Estate of
Leder v. Comm’r, 893 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1989); Estate of
Headrick v. Comm’r, 918 F.2d 1263 (6th Cir. 1990). Ltr.
Rul. 9809032, Nov. 25, 1997.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The taxpayer was a
corporation which sold seed, herbicide, fertilizer, farm
equipment and other farming supplies to farmers. The
corporation used the cash method of accounting for tax
purposes. The corporation was owned by one person who
carried the business far beyond the mere selling of
merchandise. The owner provided financial and other help
to area farmers, often borrowing money to help the farmers
meet their supply needs. The corporation allowed the
purchasing of supplies on credit and had substantial income
from interest charged on the loans and credit purchases.
Testimony of several farmers demonstrated that the
owner’s efforts were crucial to the survival of several
farming operations in the area. The corporation did not own
any farm land nor did it raise any crops or livestock. The
corporation had gross income of over $3 million in the tax
years at issue. The IRS argued that the corporation was
required to use the accrual method of accounting and
maintain inventories. The court held that the corporation
had to use inventories and the accrual method of
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accounting because the sale of merchandise was a
substantial income producing factor in the business. The
court also held that the corporation was not a farmer
eligible for the cash method of accounting because the
corporation was not directly involving in any farming
activity. The corporation argued that it was involved in
farming because it bore the risk of farming activities
through the loans to farmers and the credit purchases. The
court found, however, that most of the loans and credit
purchases were secured. The court also noted that the
taxable income of the corporation was substantially
different under the two methods of accounting, with the
accrual method more closely reflecting actual income.
Ward Ag Products, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-
84.
REORGANIZATIONS. The taxpayer corporation
acquired all the stock of a second corporation in exchange
for voting stock in a reorganization which qualified under
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). The second corporation also had six
percent 15-year debentures outstanding, some of which
were not held by shareholders. The debentures were
securities and not equity interests, under I.R.C. § 354(a)(1).
The taxpayer also acquired the debentures of the second
corporation for an equal amount of similar debentures. The
IRS ruled that the exchange of debentures did not cause any
recognition of gain or loss because the exchange occurred
pursuant to a plan of reorganization. Rev. Rul. 98-10,
I.R.B. 1998-__, __, modifying 68-637, 1968-2 C.B. 158;
69-142, 1969-1 C.B. 107; Rev. Rul. 70-41, 1970-1 C.B.
77; Rev. Rul. 78-408, 1978-2 C.B. 203.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayer was a plaintiff in a class-action sex
discrimination lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and received a payment from the defendant for
release of the taxpayer’s claim. The court listed 10 previous
Tax Court cases involving other plaintiffs from this lawsuit,
all of which held that the proceeds of the settlement were
included in gross income. The court followed those cases
since the taxpayer presented no new arguments. Reiher v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-75.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The  taxpayers,
husband and wife, were employed full-time as an attorney
and accountant respectively. The taxpayers purchased 13
acres of land with the intention of starting an Arabian horse
breeding farm. The taxpayers cleared the land and
constructed farm buildings, including a nine-horse barn.
The husband attended several seminars on breeding,
training, showing and selling horses and employed
professional horse trainers. The taxpayers, however, did not
consult with any expert on how to make the operation
profitable, nor did they have a long-term business plan. The
case involved 1991, 1992 and 1993 tax years, although the
operation was carried on from 1983 through 1996. The
taxpayers also had revenue from the raising of steers,
averaging four steers per year, and from the boarding of
horses belonging to others. The taxpayers maintained
records of income and expenses for tax purposes but had no
individual animal records nor any records which could be
used to evaluate the profitability of the business. The
operation never produced a profit. The court held that the
farm operation was not entered into with the intent to make
a profit because of several factors, as established in Treas.
Reg. § 1.183-2(a): (1) the farm was not operated in a
business-like manner because the taxpayers did not
maintain sufficient records to evaluate the profitability of
the business; (2) the taxpayers did not seek professional
advice nor become trained in the economics of horse-
breeding; (3) although the taxpayers and their daughter
spent substantial amount of time on the activity, much of
the activity was recreational; (4) the taxpayers had no
expectation that the operation would ever become
profitable; (5) although the taxpayers had success at their
other business activities, they did not apply that expertise to
the horse activity; (6) the activity produced only losses; and
(7) the taxpayers had significant income from other
sources. Dodge v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-89.
INTEREST. The taxpayer was a shareholder in a
corporation which engaged in the business of purchasing,
holding, developing, leasing and selling real property. The
corporation sold several properties which produced
recognition of gain. After an IRS audit, the sales were
determined to have produced more taxable gain than was
reported and the taxpayer’s personal tax liability was
increased. The taxpayer paid the tax deficiency and interest
and allocated some of the interest to the business, claiming
a deduction for that portion of the interest. The IRS denied
the interest deduction under Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)
which disallowed all interest on taxes, regardless of the
source of the tax. The court held that the regulation was
invalid in that it disallowed a deduction for interest on a tax
debt relating to a trade or business. The IRS argued that
interest on a tax deficiency was not an ordinary expense of
the taxpayer because this was the only time the taxpayer
had incurred such an expense. The court held that the
interest expense was an ordinary and necessary businesses
expense because the interest arose from a restructuring of
the sales transaction and involved a complex tax issue.
Allen v. United States, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,196 (E.D. N.C. 1997).
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. In May 1995,
the partnership filed for bankruptcy which continued up to
the time of this case. In July 1996, the IRS filed a final
partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA) with the tax
matters partner. In June 1997, the Bankruptcy Court issued
an order lifting the automatic stay as to the tax matters
partner’s filing of a petition for readjustment. The IRS
argued that the petition was untimely filed because it was
filed more than 90 days after the FPAA. The partnership
argued that the petition for readjustment was prevented by
the automatic stay. The court held that the automatic stay
applied only to partnership actions and, because a FPAA
involved tax items concerning the partners individually, the
automatic stay did not apply to a petition for readjustment.
Hoyt & Sons Ranch Properties, Ltd. v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1998-77.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in February
1998, the weighted average is 6.73 percent with the
permissible range of 6.06 to 7.14 percent (90 to 109 percent
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permissible range) and 6.06 to 7.14 percent (90 to 110
percent permissible range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 98-
15, I.R.B. 1998-_, _.
RETURN. In 1993 the taxpayer was married but the
taxpayer and spouse separated late in that year. In early
1994, the parties agreed to have the taxpayer file a joint
return. When the spouse learned that no return had been
filed, the spouse filed a married, filing separately, return.
The taxpayer then filed a joint return.. The IRS rejected the
joint return and recomputed the taxpayer’s tax by removing
the spouse’s income, the personal deduction for the spouse
and redetermining the taxpayer’s taxed based on a married,
filing separately, status. The court upheld the IRS
determination because, whether or not an agreement
existed, at the time the joint return was filed, the spouse
had no longer intended to file a joint return and never
ratified the joint return after it was filed. Etesam v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-73.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
March 1998
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.39 5.32 5.29 5.26
110% AFR 5.94 5.85 5.81 5.78
120% AFR 6.48 6.92 6.86 6.30
Mid-term
AFR 5.59 5.51 5.47 5.45
110% AFR 6.15 6.06 6.01 5.98
120% AFR 6.72 6.61 6.56 6.52
Long-term
AFR 5.91 5.83 5.79 5.76
110% AFR 6.51 6.41 6.36 6.33
120% AFR 7.12 7.00 6.94 6.90
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer was
a shareholder in an S corporation which was a partner in a
joint venture which realized discharge of indebtedness
income in 1991. The taxpayer increased the basis of the
taxpayer’s S corporation stock by the taxpayer’s share of
the discharge of indebtedness income passed through the S
corporation. At the time of the discharge of the
indebtedness, the S corporation was insolvent and had net
operating losses. The increase in the stock basis enabled the
taxpayer to deduct the carried-over losses in a later year.
The IRS argued that the discharge of indebtedness income
was not an item of income for purposes of determining
stock basis because discharge of indebtedness income was
excluded under the insolvency exclusion rule of I.R.C. §
108. The Tax Court had originally held that, under I.R.C. §
61(a)(12), discharge of indebtedness is an item of income
which increases a shareholder’s basis under I.R.C. § 1367.
The court did not discuss the effect of Section 108 on the
stock basis, because the issue was not raised by the IRS.
The ruling was withdrawn after a decision in Nelson v.
Comm’r, 110 T.C. No 12 (1998) which held that, because
the corporation was insolvent, I.R.C. § 108 caused an
exclusion of the discharge of indebtedness income which
was offset by reduction in tax attributes of the corporation,
leaving no tax consequences to flow to the shareholders
such as would increase the shareholders’ basis in stock.
Winn v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-71, withdrawing
T.C. Memo. 1997-286.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME. The taxpayers,
husband and wife, were the sole shareholders of an S
corporation which operated a hauling business. Two other
businesses hired the wife to perform dispatching services
for the companies’ truck fleets. The companies paid the
wife directly for the services and sent the wife 1099MISC
forms corresponding to the payments. For the three years
involved in the case, the dispatch income was reported for
two years as the corporation’s income and the third year as
the wife’s income, subject to self-employment tax. The
court held that the dispatch income was earned by the wife
and subject to self-employment tax in all three years. The
court pointed out that the corporation paid the taxpayers no
wages and the corporation never had control of the dispatch
income. Ruckman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-83.
THEFT LOSS. The taxpayer invested in a company
which repaired business equipment. However, the company
used the investments as part of a Ponzi scheme and
eventually filed for bankruptcy. The taxpayer claimed a
theft loss deduction, believing that the bankruptcy filing
meant that the taxpayer would not recover on the debt.
However, the court found that the bankruptcy trustee had
determined that some recovery by the unsecured creditors
would be available and another investor did receive a 50
percent recovery. The court held that the debt was not
deductible as a theft loss because a reasonable prospect of
recovery existed in the year the deduction was claimed.
This case is designated as not for publication. Premji v.
Comm’r, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,218 (10th Cir.
1998).
WITHHOLDING TAXES . The taxpayer corporation
determined that it would save money by leasing its farm
workers from another corporation instead of directly
employing the workers. Apparently, the second corporation
had some ties to the taxpayer but was determined to be a
separate corporation. The second corporation paid all
employee expenses for the workers, including workers’
compensation and medical insurance, from its own account.
The taxpayer paid the second corporation rent equal to the
employees’ wages, withholding taxes, and FICA and
unemployment taxes. The court held that the taxpayer was
not responsible for payment of the withholding taxes to the
government because the workers were employees of the
second corporation. Alexander Drilling, Inc. v. U.S., 98-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,224 (W.D. Ark. 1998).
NEGLIGENCE
ASSUMPTION OF RISK. The plaintiff was injured
while participating in a cattle roundup of cattle owned by
the defendants on property leased to the defendants. The
roundup used persons on horses, “muggers” (persons who
tie up the captured cattle) and ropes to capture and secure
the cattle instead of mechanical chutes. This method was
chosen because it made the work “more of a fun event.”
The plaintiff was not an employee of the defendants but
participated in the work because other participants had
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                               39
helped the plaintiff in the past with the plaintiff’s cattle.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in
using the horse and rope roundup method instead of the
safer mechanical chute method. The court held that the
judge-made doctrine of primary assumption of risk applied
to relieve the defendant of liability because the plaintiff
was aware of the obvious risks in the work and given the
nature of the activity, the defendant did not owe the
plaintiff a duty to protect the plaintiff from the harm
incurred. The court, as did the plaintiff, characterized the
horse and rope method as similar to a sporting event;
therefore, absent an employer-employee relationship, the
primary assumption of risk doctrine applied in this case.
This case was sent to us by Michael Mauer, CA.
Domenghini v. Evans, 70 Cal. Rptr.2d 917 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
LEASE OR SECURITY INTEREST. The debtor
acquired a “vac-u-vator” (a vacuum-operated grain removal
machine) and a tractor, each under a “lease” through a
bank. The leases provided for downpayments, annual lease
payments, an option to purchase the equipment at the end
of the lease and options for extending the leases. The major
difference between the leases was that the vac-u-vator
could be purchased for 10 percent of the fair market value
at the beginning of the lease and the tractor could be
purchased for 30 percent of the fair market value at the
beginning of the lease. The court found that the 10 percent
purchase price was less than the residual value of the vac-u-
vator and that the 30 percent purchase price was
substantially less than the residual value of the tractor. The
bank sought relief from the automatic stay to foreclose
against the equipment. The debtor argued that the leases
were intended to be security agreements and, because the
bank was adequately protected on its security interests, no
relief from the automatic stay should be granted. The court
first held that the nature of the “leases” was to be
determined under Minn. Stat. § 336.1-201(37) which
creates six tests for a finding of a security interest, with the
sixth test applied only if the first five are met. The court
held that the vac-u-vator lease created a security interest
because (1) the debtor paid for the right to possession for
the term of the lease, (2) the vac-u-vator had economic life
at the end of the lease, (3) the debtor was not required to
renew the lease for the entire economic life of the vac-u-
vator, (4) the debtor had an option to purchase the
equipment at the end of the lease, (5) the option purchase
price was for no more than a nominal amount. The court
held that the tractor lease did not create a security interest
because (1) the debtor paid for the right to possession for
the term of the lease, (2) the tractor had economic life at the
end of the lease, (3) the debtor was not required to renew
the lease for the entire economic life of the tractor, (4) the
debtor had an option to purchase the tractor at the end of
the lease, (5) the option purchase price was for more than a
nominal amount. Because the fifth test was met, the court
examined the sixth factor of whether the lessor retained any
reversionary interest which could produce a benefit or risk
to the lessor. The court found that the tractor would have
significant value at the end of the lease which would accrue
to the lessor; therefore, the lease was a true lease and the
bank was granted relief from the automatic stay to
foreclose against the tractor. This case was sent to us by R.
Crayne, Sioux City, IA. In re Bielenberg, Bankr. No. 97-
03063-S (Bankr. N. D. Iowa, Jan. 26, 1998).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
LIVESTOCK CONFINEMENT FACILITIES.
Humboldt County in Iowa enacted four ordinances
pertaining to livestock confinement operations. The
ordinances required (1) obtaining a permit for construction,
(2) meeting certain financial requirements, (3) meeting
groundwater quality protection requirements, and (4)
meeting air quality emission standards. The divided court
held that the ordinances were not zoning regulations and
did not violate the exemption of agricultural land from
zoning regulations. The court held that each ordinance
conflicted with state statutes by establishing more
restrictive requirements than provided by state law. Thus,
the county ordinance went beyojnd what was permissable
under the state’s “home rule” amendment to its
constitution. Goodell v. Humboldt County, ___ N.W.2d
___ (Iowa 1998).
MILK. The Montana Department of Health and
Environment (DHES) examined samples of milk sold by
the plaintiff’s dairy and found an unidentified black
substance in the milk. The substance was observable by the
public and turned the milk gray when a container was
shaken. The DHES issued a notice of embargo on all milk
and milk products produced by the dairy with the same
expiration date. The plaintiff also destroyed 15,000 gallons
of milk and filed a claim for compensation which was
denied. The plaintiff filed a complaint challenging the
embargo on three grounds: (1) deprivation of property
without due process, (2) lack of probable cause that the
milk was adulterated, and (3) lack of authority of DHES to
issue the embargo. The trial court granted the DHES
summary judgment on all three grounds, but the plaintiff
appealed the decision only as to the first two grounds. The
first ground was determined to be linked to the second
ground in that the due process argument was based on the
lack of probable cause to issue the embargo. The plaintiff’s
primary argument was that Mont. Code § 50-31-509
allowed the embargo only after a finding that food was
adulterated so as to be dangerous to human health. The
DHES had found only that the milk was adulterated with an
unknown substance. The court interpreted the statute to not
require that the adulteration be shown to be dangerous
before an embargo could be imposed. The plaintiff also
argued that a de minimis standard be applied because the
substance was not shown to be harmful. The court held that
contamination which was sufficient to turn the milk gray
was not de minimis adulteration and upheld the summary
judgment on all grounds. Clover Leaf Dairy v. State, 948
P.2d 1164 (Mont. 1997).
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PRINCIPLES OF
AGRICULTURAL LAW
by Roger McEowen & Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf textbook is
ideal for instructors, attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who teach agricultural law courses in
law schools or at the junior college or university levels.
The book contains over 900 pages plus an index, table
of cases and glossary. The chapters include discussion of
legal issues, examples, lengthy quotations from cases and
review questions.
Instructors who adopt the text for purchase by students
receive a free copy and all updates. Updates are published
every August and December to keep the Principles current
with the latest developments. Student purchasers are
entitled to one free update, with subsequent updates
available at $30 per year.
If you would like a review a copy or to purchase a copy
of the Principles, please contact: Agricultural Law Press,
P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients.
The book contains over 900 pages and an index. The
Manual is particularly strong in the areas of federal income
and estate taxes, farm bankruptcy, and farm business
planning.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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